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Introduction to Symposium on Birth
Rights and Wrongs, by Dov Fox

PETER SCHUCK*

I am privileged and delighted to write a brief introduction to this fine
group of articles assessing Professor Dov Fox’s recent book, Birth Rights and
Wrongs.1 It is a special pleasure for me because as a teacher of Professor Fox
in a Yale Law School seminar (on an unrelated subject), I had the
opportunity to observe him at an inflection point in his arc between his work
for the president’s bioethics council and his dawning career in the legal
academy. The Yale faculty awarded Fox the prize for the best paper on
law and the life sciences in each of his three years at the law school. It
was there that he began integrating the burgeoning fields of reproductive
technology, bioethical normativity, and legal regulation to find better
solutions to the conflicts thrown up by their convergence. Birth Rights and
Wrongs is the rich, nourishing fruit of that long-gestating ambition.
This symposium consists of four essays by leading academic commentators
developing their distinctive takes on the book, followed by a conclusion
by Professor Fox containing detailed responses to each of them. This
introduction provides a very brief, largely descriptive tour d’horizon of
the commentators’ essays.
Robin West, after sympathetically summarizing Fox’s argument, discusses
the fact that tort law fails to protect social interests that are more important
than some interests that it does protect—and considers some of the reasons
why courts resist protecting the former. But while accepting Fox’s analysis
on its own terms, she devotes most of her paper on two “qualms” that she
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harbors about his analysis. The first, which she associates with Roberto
Unger’s critical theory, is that Fox conducts his analysis without really
questioning, much less subverting, the social context that we inhabit and
take for granted. Invoking Ungerian conceptions, she challenges Fox’s
“truncating of critique.” The second, which follows directly from this, is
the “legitimation cost” that this truncation of vision entails. West then
develops these critiques by arguing that Fox’s implicit celebration of
planning and intention in our procreation choices echoes and perhaps even
reinforces American society’s commitments to consumerism, careerism, and
individualism. Fox, she writes, implies both “that this is the kind of
procreating we should do, and that this kind of procreating is in turn an
activity that should be protected by law against negligence.” To West,
these assumptions have some appeal but are not adequately articulated or
defended, and are “problematic.” At the risk of exceeding a symposium
introducer’s limited role, I shall add that I find this part of her analysis
itself problematic, even implausible. She hopes to cast doubt on the notion
that the law may legitimately place its thumb on the normative scale in
favor of reflective reproductive conduct and choice. This doubt seems
particularly misplaced when the plaintiff is simply seeking to shift to
negligent providers the potentially enormous costs of their negligence
which they could have avoided with due care. Whatever one’s view of
Unger’s social vision, reproductive tort law is a singularly inapt tool for
pursuing that vision, especially since Fox’s reforms would better promote
that vision than today’s remedial lacunae.
The contribution of David Wasserman, a bioethicist at the National
Institutes of Health, focuses on the moral costs imposed by compensating
parents for the then-unwanted children whom the defendant provider’s
negligence foisted on them but whom they now love. His analysis raises
important questions about different categories of damages that the law
might treat differently, and the circumstances under which the state should
be the costs of caring for such children. Wasserman describes three
philosophical accounts of how the parents might welcome the child’s
existence while still pressing for compensation that might imply that the
child’s birth should have been prevented. And he urges that the law
compromise competing moral considerations in light of the financial and
other constraints that may burden parents who are obliged by defendants’
negligence to raise children whom they did not want or expect: “Adopting a
morally awkward posture,” Wasserman suggests, “may be a small price
for securing the resources needed to adequately support a severely disabled
child. It would be presumptuous to insist that such parents forego needed
resources rather than press claims that are inconsistent with unqualified
acceptance and love. Indeed, the tort regime Fox proposes may be fully
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justified in a decidedly non-ideal world where the support for raising disabled
children is woefully inadequate.”
Reuven Brandt’s paper mostly explores two categories of cases that he
thinks Fox has ignored. The first is what Brandt terms “private reproductive
wrongs” which occur outside of the patient/provider relationship—a category
that includes deceptive conduct or communications that violate norms of
fair, responsible, good faith behavior toward a sexual partner or mate/
spouse. Such behaviors might trigger tort liability—for example they might
be treated as tortious batteries—but then again they might not for certain
doctrinal or other reasons. Brandt thinks that they should be tortious and
that Fox should have included them in his analysis. In addition, Brandt
wants to expand the universe of rights-holders to the children who by reason
of defendants’ negligence are deprived of a relationship with their biological
progenitor. His analysis goes on to consider several controversial issues—
for example, the value of donor anonymity and the incentives to donate
one’s sexual material—that would arise under such a child-centered legal
regime.
Richard Epstein’s contribution is consistent with his work in the vast
number of fields in which he has labored so productively. He agrees with
Fox’s assessment of the values that the emergent reproductive technologies
implicate, and he seems to think that conventional tort doctrines, suitably
adjusted to take account of the kinds of probabilistic risks and intangible
harms that such adjudications would entail, could remedy the three types
of wrongs—procreation deprived, imposed, and confounded—that Fox
explores. But Epstein then speculates about why tort law has resisted
providing the kinds of remedies that Fox advocates for these wrongs—in
contrast with, say, the expansion of medical malpractice liability (until
and unless limited by statute). Epstein devotes most of his commentary
to developing two explanations for tort law’s hesitancy here. First, the
interactions that Fox analyzes are consensual; the market for reproductive
technologies consists of a direct exchange between a consumer seeking
medical intervention to facilitate or prevent child-bearing, and a professional
who agrees to provide those services. Second, technological advance in
this area under the largely hands-off legal regime that Fox criticizes has been
remarkably swift and successful. Fox’s desired tort reforms, Epstein suggests,
are inconsequential where, as here, a huge market for innovation exists that
benefits both consumers and providers. Epstein argues, in opposition
to Fox, that, importing tort liability into this market would threaten many
of these gains, making almost everybody worse off.
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